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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SPRINGVILLE BANKING COMPANY, 
.a corpora.tion, Plaintiff, 
VS~ 
C. TAYLOR BURTON~ ERNEST H. 
BALCH~ WESTON E. HAMILTON~ ; 
FRANCIS FELTCH and W. J~ SMIRL, 
individually and as members of the 
UTAH S1'ATE RQAD COMMISSION, 
DefendantJ . . 
Case No .. 
9066 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENl~ OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from judgment of the District Court 
of Salt Lake Countyj by Hon~ Stewart M. Hanson, dismissing 
plaintiff) s action. 
The complaint ( R. 1) was filed on February 4, 1959> and 
personal service made ~pon C+ Taylor Burton and Weston E. 
Hamilton, two of the named defendants, the following day. 
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• 
Believing it appropriate under Section 27·2-13 Utah Code 
A d · ·· defl~~ nnotate 19 53, the Attorney General of Utali moved to A. • 
dismiss on three grounds: ( 1) lack of subject-matter jut is-
diction; ( 2) lack of personal jurisdiction; and ( 3) fai 1 ure to 
state a claim upon which relief might be granted~ No affidavit 
or othe~ proof was received by the Court either in support of 
or in opposition to the motion. 
On April 2 2~ 195 9, the Court entered a judgment of 
dismissal of the action apparent} y basing its ruling solely upon 
the contents of the complaint. The complaint) except for the 
caption and signa turet is set on t below~ 
fF 
1. The defendants} as members of the Utah State Road 
Commission~ are charged with the duty of acquiring rights 
of way and instituting necessary actions to condemn private 
property for public highway use. 
2 ~ The plaintiff is now~ and for the past three years has 
been continuously the owner of and in possession of a lot and 
building located on the northeast corner of Seventh South 
and Ma.in Streets in Springville, Utah County, Utah. 
3. The said two streets have been dedicated and set apart 
to the use of the public and to the special uses of the ad joining 
lot owners~ as public streets and highways, and prior to the 
actions of the defendants as hereinafter alleged had been used 
as public streets continuously and constantly for many years. 
4. In about April and May, 195 8, defendants constructed 
concrete strips, or islands~ within the boundaries of Main 
Street near the point at 'vhich Main and Seventh South Streets 
intersect. 
4 
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5. The concrete islands are of such length and were con-
strue ted in such a manner that ingress and egress to and from 
the plain tiff's property has been great! y impeded, and the value 
of plain tiffs property h a.s been greatly depreciated~ 
6. The impeding of plaintiffs ingress and egress \vas 
determined by defendants to be necessary £or the proper and 
skillful construction of a highway for use of the public, and 
the high way was skillfully and properly constructed+ 
7. The concrete islands are of a permanent nature and 
will continue to impede ingress and egress in the manner here-
tofore alleged, and defendants have, for the use and benefit 
of the State of Utah, damaged the plaintiff~ s property for 
public use within the meaning of Article I) Section 22~ Utah 
Constitution. 
8. Plaintiff has never been paid or received any com-
pensation \vhatever on account of its damages by reason of 
the construction as aforesaid; and the de£ en dants have asserted 
that they have a right to construct and change the design of 
highways in front of the plain tiffs premises at will and 'that 
there l) no obligation on the part of the State of L;tah to 
com pens ate plaintiff for damages resulting from improvements 
upon or changes in the hlghway. · 
9 ~ PI a in tiff contends~ on the other hand~ that the de£ end-
antst impeding of ingress and egress to and from plain tiffs 
property is a dama.ge of property -vtrithin the meaning of Article 
I~ Section 2 2 of the Utah Constitution) that the damage is 
compensible under the laws of the State of Uta.h~ and that as 
the members of the Utah State Road Commission defendants 
5 . -~:·· 
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I 
have an obligation to pay plain tiff £or its · damages or to 
commence a proceeding pursuant to Ti tie 78, Chapter 34, Utah 
Co de .Annotated 195 3~ in which plaintiff's damages can be 
ascertained and assessed. 
10. Although demands have been made upon them, the 
de£ en dan ts have ~efused to take steps or initiate an action 
against the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of Title 78, 
Chapter 34, Utah Code Annotated, 195 3. 
WHEREFORE) Plaintiff prays to the court: 
1. · For a declaration~ pws uan t to Title 78, Chapter 3 3 ~ 
Utah ~ode Annotated 195 3) that the impending of ingress and 
egress to and from plain tiff's pro petty, for public use, is 
damage for which plaintiff is entitled to compensation wtder 
the provisions of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, 
and that defendants have a duty to initiate an action pursuant 
to Title 78~ Chapter 34, Utah Code Annotated 1953) in which 
plaintiff's damages can be ascertained and assessed. 
2. For an order, pursuant to Rule 65 (B) (3) of tbe Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, compelling the de£ endants to initiate 
an action against the plaintiff in the District Court of Utah 
County in accordance with the provisions of Title 78~ Chapter 
34, Utah Code Annotated 195 3, in · which the plaintiff may 
have the amount of its damages ascertained and assessed. •• 
On May 19 ~ 19 59~ the plaintiff filed its . notice of appeal 
from the ord·er of dismissaL 
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STATEMENT OF POIN1~S 
1.. The Court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject 
matter+ 
2. By the impeding of ingress and egress plaintiff}s prop-
erty has been .. damaged for public use'~ within the meaning of 
Article I, Section 2 2, of the Utah Constitution .. 
3 r An action in the nature of mandamus pursuant to Rul c 
65 (B) ( 3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate to 
compel the de£ endants to initiate proceedings under which 
plaintiff's damages may be ascertained and assessed. 
4. If manda~us will not lie, this is a proper case for a 
declaratory judgment action against the individual members of 
the Road Commission. 
ARGU:MENT 
I 
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION·Qp THE PARTIES 
AND THE SUBJECT MATTER. 
Although respondents' motion to dismiss questioned the 
Court's · · j ur isdicti on over the subject matter~ j and ''jurisdiction 
over the persons... we question that the question 'vas meant to 
be serious. Process was served personally upon C. Taylor Burton 
and Weston E. Hamilton~ giving the Court jurisdiction over 
those two defendants. If the motion filed by the Attorney 
General in behalf o £ the defendants does not constitute a.n 
appearance for the others, the Court nevertheless has jurisdic-
tion to proceed, and under the provisions of Rule 4(b) of the 
7 
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lil!l 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ~!the other or others 1na y be 
served or appear at anytime before tria.L'J The contention 
that there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter,.. is answered 
by the provision of Article VIII, Section 7 of the Utah Con. 
sti tu tion, conferring upon District Courts original juris diction 
and power to issue writs of habeas corpus l mandamus) in june· 
tion~ quo warranto,· certiorari, prohibition, and other writs 
necessary to carry in to effect their orders :t judgments· and decrees 
and to give them a general control over itiferior courts and 
tribunils within their respectiv~ jurisdiction, also conferring 
upon them noriginal jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimi-
nal} not excepted in this Constitu~ion and not prohibited by 
law."' cf. Brady v, McGonagle ( 1921) 57 Utah 424, 195 Pac. 
18 8) 191 + The Courf s jurisdiction over the sub j oct matter is 
also recognized by the provisions of Rule 6 5 B and 7 8-3 3~ 1 
Utah Code Annotated 195 3. 
II 
BY THE IMPEDING OF INGRESS AND EGRESS 
PLAINTJ.F_F'S PROPERTY HAS BEEN· t~DAMAGED FOR 
PUBLIC USEH WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 
1~ SECTION 22, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
This Court, consistent with decisions of federal courts 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has approved the 
view that it is improper to dismiss a complaint for totfailure 
-~to state a claim upon which relief can be granted" unless ~ 4 it 
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be enti tied 
to no relief under any sta.te of facts which could be proved 
in support of the claim/' .recognizing that the purpose of a 
8 
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complaint unckr our present rules of practice is to ngive the 
opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds 
of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation 
involved." See Blackham N. Snelgfove ( 1955) 3 Utah 2d 157, 
280 P.2d 453 and 2 Moore's Federal Practice (2nd Ed.) 2244. 
The complaint leaves no doubt that the plaintiff is claiming 
a right to be compensated for a substantial interference, by 
the defendants acting in their roles as members of the Utah 
State Road Commission, with the plaintiff~ s right of access to 
its property. In a line of cases be ginning in terri to rial days 
this Court has held that the right of access to real pro petty is. 
.a valuable property right which may not be taken away without 
compensation .. 
One of the earliest cases is Dool:y Block et a! V~ Salt La_ke 
Rapid T1ansit Company (1893) 9 Utah 31, 33 Pac. 229} 224 
L.R.A. 61 0, dealing with interference with and use of a city 
street resulting from construction of railroad tracksr Noting 
that the trial court had found the fee of Second South Street 
to be held by Salt Lake City in trust for street uses proper l the 
Court concluded: 
!tTherefore, under the law as applied to this class 
of cases, plain tiffs have property rights in the street 
in front of their lotsl and the street is not subject to 
the absolute con tro I of the legislature, nor can the 
legislature confer such control upon the city council/' 
The Court affirmed the judgment enjoining the Salt Lake Rapid 
Transit Company (claiming to operate under franchise from 
Salt Lake City) from laying a track in the street in front of 
plaintiff~ s property. 
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In 1Y1ortis v. Oregon Shoft Line R. Company (1909) 36 
Utah 14, 102 Pa.c. 629~ an abuttip.g owner brought. action to 
recover damages arising by. r~a."~on of the .. ~nstiuction and 
operation of a zailroad in a public street. The_ complaint alleged 
that the tracks Vit'Ould be permanently used fo t the defendant· s 
trains and also the trains of another rai~oad company and 
(as paraphrased by the ·court) .. ~that by reason 0 f the foregoing 
facts res pond ent' s property will be· ih j uriousl y affected; that 
the ingress and egress to and from the srune will be greatly 
impeded; and that by other means directly attributable to tbe 
laying of said tracks) and the operation of said trains over 
them, as stated, the value of said property has been g rea t1 y 
· depreciated~'' The Supreme Court upheld a judgment fo.r the 
property owner after noting that the trial court had adopted 
the theory that the impeding of ingress and egress .to and from 
the property because of operation of the raiiroad comes vdthin 
the provisions of Article I, Section 2 2 of the U ta.h Constitution 
that t ·private property shall not be taken or damaged for p~blic 
use without just compensation.n "fhe Supreme Court stated: 
~'That an ov.rner of property, which abuts on a. public 
street, has such a property right in the street that he 
may, in a proper action, recover dru.nages for an inter-
fer.ence with such right, when such interference directly· 
affects his property, is too well settled by the authorities 
to require a further discussion. * * * In such an action 
everything which arises out of the p1oper construction 
and pro per operation of the r a.il road which direct1 y 
affects tbe salable value of the abutting property may 
o rd inaril y be considered as· elements in ass ess~ng dam-
ages. * * * Such an action is no different in principle 
from an action fo.r damages to· the remaining property 
where a part only is condemned. T~e easement the 
10 
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abutting owner has in the street is a property tight, 
and an interference with this right is, to the extent of 
the interference, deemed a taking of property for 
which., if such taking directly inju.tes the abutting prop-
erty, as a£ ore said, the ownet may recover damages. :r:r 
State v. District Court1 Fourth 1 udicial District ( 193 7) 
94 Utah 3 84~ 7 8 P .. 2 d 5 02, which "rill be discussed at grea.ter 
length hereinafter, recognizes a right~ of access as a p.ro pe.rty 
right which may not be taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation. 
~ 
The right of an abutting owner to recover for .nshutting 
oH or interfering with his access, light~ or ait.," was recognized 
by the Court again in State by State Road Commission ·t··~ 
Rozzelle et ux. ( 1941) 101 Uath 464, 120 P+2d 276, i~ which 
both the rna jority and concurring opinions accept the principle 
that abutting owners are entitled to compensation for 'otany 
losses resulting from unreasonably cutting off their own access 
to their property.' :r 
The right of abutters was recognized again in Boskovich 
v. Midvale City Corporation ( 1952) 121 Utah 445~ 243 P.2d 
4) 5, in which the Court noted: 
''We have held~ in a case cited even by the defend~ 
ants, that if the dedicated streets of a subdivision are 
laid out and right to the use thereof has arisen~ a 
priva. te easement arises therein, which constitutes a 
vested proprietary interest in the lot owners, which 
easement survives extinguishment of any co"existing 
public easement calling for .just compensation. Hence, 
Mr. B cannot be cul.de-sacked by the city or the school_ 
board without due process of law~ and a respect for 
any loss proven to have been enjoyed by him thereto-
11 
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fore,-though such loss may not be great~ This is as it 
shou~d. ?e, since people customarily buy property in 
su bdi vtstons ~ part of the consideration for which is 
paid on the representation. and assumption that the 
~latted streets, dedicated and duly accepted, shall con-
tlnue as a means of travel until public exigency other-
:Vise demands,-. in which jatter event due process and 
JUSt compensat1on must enter the picture.!• 
We are aware of cases denyjng an abutting owner the 
tight to compeqsation for _damage·to his right of access. Other 
courts have reached a variety of results, their decisions fre-
quent! y depending upon particu]ar provisions of a· state con. 
s ti tu tion, e.g~, prohibiting the ·~taking~~ of property without 
just compensation but not prohibiting the ~·damaging."' For 
a co 11 ection of cases touching upon this and related problems 
see anrtota ted, t 4 Right of Abutting Owner to Compensatio~ 
for Interference with Access by Bridge or Otha; Structure in 
Public Street or Highway ;J) t 45 A~L.R. 5 34 et seq.; and an-
notated~ '~Abutting Owner~s Right to Damages or Other Relief 
for Loss of Access Because of Limited-Access Highway or 
St!eet~' ~ 43 A.L.R. 2 d 1072, 10 77. Regardless of what other 
courts have done, under the U tab constitutional provision~ it 
should be clear that an abutting owner may not have his -right 
of access taken or substantially impaired unless he is .adequately 
compensated. · 
A reasonable construction of the com plaint in this case 
makes it clear that the plaintiff is not seeking to recover merely 
bee a use of the diversion of traffic, or circuity of travel neces-
sitated by re~ routing of a street not abutting its property, as in 
Robinett v. Price ( 1929) 7 4 Utah 512, 280 Pac~ 73b It should 
be clear from the complaint that plaintiff js complaining of a 
12 
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situation simi la.r to that considered by the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi in Hanzilton et al. v. MissiJsippi State High Com-
minioH ( 19)4) 220 Miss. 340, 1ofe'2d 856, an action to enjoin 
the highway commission from maintaining a median strip in 
a highway intersecting a city street. There the Supreme Court 
ts Mississippi held that the plaintiff, whose property lay along 
the street and the highway, was an uabutter" on the street 
and that the street could not be vacated without paying the 
plaintiff compensation. To the argument that the plaintiff 
had not shown that his damages were any different than other 
property owners the Court noted that this is the kind of thing 
which should be the subject of proof at a trial and should 
not be decided on a motion for dismissal of the com plaint. 
At the trial in the instant case--on the pleading filed-plaintiff 
would be permitted to prove that the State Road Commission 
has virtually closed two city streets as means of access to 
plain tiff~ s property and created a kind of cui-de-sac. 
III 
AN ACTION IN THE NATURE OF MANDA:MUS 
PURSUANT TO RlJLE 65B(b) (3) OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF OVIL PROCEDURE IS APPROPRIATE TO COMPEL 
THE DEFENDANTS TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS UN-
DER WHICH PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES CAN BE ASCER-
TAINED AND ASSESSED. 
The complaint having been so drawn that the plaintiffs 
would be able to prove the taking of or damage to a valuable 
property right without any compensation for it, the trial court 
erred in dismissing the complaint unless neither a proceeding 
13 
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like mandamll§. under Rule 65 B, nor a declaratory judgment 
action against the individual members of the road commission 
is an appropriate method of determining the plaintifFs rights 
or compelling the road commission members to do their duty. 
Many courts have considered the problem; and having con-
cluded that it is meaningless to talk about a ~~right \vithout a 
remedy,'' hold that where property is ~t taken or damaged t~ 
under con.stl tu tional provisions that· prohibit '"taking or dama g-
ing~ ~ without just compensation, the in jured property ovlner 
may proceed to mandamus the proper public officers+ Mandamus 
has been granted not only to require payment of an award 
but to com pel initiation of appropriate proceedings established 
by statute for the ascertainment and as sessm.ent of damages. 
The following cases are representative~ a great number hoJ ding 
mandamus to be proper~ 
In Dawson v. Ale Kinnon et al. ( 1939) 226 Iowa 756, 
2.85 N.W. 258~ property owners sought mandamus compelling 
the clef en dan ts to initiate the p.to per statu tory proceedings to 
assess damages sustained by the plaintiff bee a use of the impair-
ment of access, ingress and egress to her property. The con-
dition had resulted £rom construction of a pub 1 ic highway. 
A judgment for the defendants was reversed on appeal to the 
Iowa Supreme Court, that court saying: 
II 
nit is our judgment that the defendant conunis-
s.iooers- have taken the larger part of the drive, street, 
or way over which the appellant had an easement, and 
in doing so they have destroyed a property right which 
she had therein~ and have very seriously interefeted 
with and impaired the access which she had to and 
from her land, causing her damage which she is en· 
14 
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titled to have established in the manner required by 
l :lo! a\v. 
The doctrine announced in Dawson Vr McKinnon was 
affirmed in Baird ['. Johnson ( 1941) 230 Iowa 161~ N.W~ 
315 and in Anderlik eta!. t;. State Highway Commission et aL 
( 1949) 240 Iowa 919~ 38 N. W. 2d 605~ The latter action was 
brought to compel the highway commission to institute con~ 
demnation proceedings for assessment of damages for con-
struction of an approach to a vladict in the highway in front 
of plaintiffs residences. After holding that the substantial 
im pa irmen t of or inter£ erence with rights of access~ 1i gh t ~ ai t 
or view is a ntakingp within the m·eaning of the Iowa consti-
tution the Court a gaJn held: 
~~Mandamus will lie to compel the institution of 
condemnation proceedings v-lh ere there bas been a 
taking of private property for public use without com-
pensating the owner.:>' 
The Supreme Court of Illinois has approved the issuance 
of a \~·rit of mandamus to compel institution of proceedings 
to ascertain compensation 'vhere damages to land has resulted 
from the separation of grades on a highway. In People ex ret. 
First J.\Tational Bank of Blue Island v. Kingery ( 1938) 369 Ill. 
289, 16 N.E. 2d 761, holding a writ of mandamus to be proper, 
the Court said: 
'~Our Bill of Rights * * * provides that (every 
person aught to find a certain remedy in the l~ws for 
all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his 
person, property, or reputation; he ought to obtain, 
by law, right and justice freely~ and \\'tthout being 
obliged to purchase it, corn pletley and without denial, 
_promptly and without delay/ All that the plaintiff 
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in this case seeks is the right to have the judgment 
of her peers as to the amount of damages, if any, she 
has suffered. This writ is guaranteed by · Sect. 13 of 
Ar.t. II of the Constitution of Illinois [providing that 
pr1vate property shall not be taken for public use with-
out just compensation] .. 
~~It is vigorously urged that the provisions of Sect. 
281k of the Second State Bond Issue Act of 1923 (Ill. 
Rev. Stat 193 7 ~ Ch~ 121, p. 2796) and the Eminent 
Domain Act~ do not contemplate the ascertainment of 
damages which have already been in£icted~ and, also~ 
that damages resulting to an abutting proprietor} no 
part of whose land is physically taken, are likew-ise not 
within such contemplation. We cannot sustain these 
contentions. To do 'so would violate the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution~ The right of a proprietor 
to damages because his property is taken or damaged 
£or public use is absoi ute and it makes no difference 
\~..-hether the amount of damages is ascertained before 
the injury is inflicted or after it. Giving the statute 
and the Constitution any different construction would 
be to annul them .. '"' 
The Supreme Court of \\/est Virginia consistent! y has 
upheld the right to mandamus w_here property has been taken 
or damaged \vithout compensation~ In Stewart r. State Road 
Commission of West Virginia (1936) 117 W. \'a~ 352~ 185 
S .ET 567, the cornt refused to permit a mandamus action 
against the State Road Commission as .such but noted that a 
property owner whose land was taken for road purposes .is 
able to mandamus the commissioner in person to condemn 
his land. A property owner tried this in Riggs et a!. v. State 
Road Commissioner ( 1938) 120 W .. Va. 298, 197 S~E. 81'~ 
and -vvTas successful. The Court stated: 
16 
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~~In their petition a.nd proof the relators. took the 
positions that, though th ete had been no taking of any 
portion of their property~ it has been seriously damaged 
by the new constr uction:t and that~ notw"ithstandin g 
the work had been completed for five and one half 
months when the petition herein was fi] ed, the respond· 
en t has declined to institute proceedings to ascertain 
the amount of the damages suffered by relators. They 
seek mandamus to compel respondent to proceed to 
have the damages settled. Respondent by ans\ver and 
depositions l denies that the property of relators has 
been damaged. 
·~Although there is sharp con A.ict betvrecn the parties 
in both allegation and proof respecting the alleged 
damage, we are t?f the opinion that the showing made 
by relators is sufficient to entitle them to have the ·con· 
troversy determined in a proceeding usual for such 
matters. Always, in some manner;t there must be op~ 
portuni ty afforded property o\vners for judicial deter-
min a. tion . of their bona fide claims for damages to 
their property on account of public improvement. Any 
other conclusion would not be consonant with funda-
mental principles. * * * 
Hin Hard.r v. SimpJon~ Road Conlmissioner, 190 S.E. 
680, 683, ~le stated: !A duty rests on the State to take . 
necessary steps under our condemnation statutes to 
ascertain damages to the owners of priyate property, 
whether the same is actualJy taken, or damaged only~ 
* * * We conclude that the Road Commissioner may 
be required to institute such proceedings as rna y be 
necessary to ascertain and pay proper damages to 
property o\vners where their property is either taken 
or damaged; the commissioner has a reasonable dis~ 
cretion as to the time whe!l- such proceedings shall 
be instituted, in cases of property damage only. * * * 
·! (Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
17 
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fo I public use ~ithout just compensation * * * . ' W. 
V a. Const. ~ Art. III, Sect~ 9 + tIt is imperative that this 
paramount provision of our organic law be given 
......ii t ' t! ~uec ~ 
The holding in Riggs et aJ v. State Road Commissioner 
was affirmed and again applied to compel institution of pro-
ceedings in Appalachian Electfic Pou~er Company v. Sawyers 
( 1956) 141 W. Va. 769~ 93 S.E. 2d 25. 
In People ex rei~ Doyle Green et al ( 1875) 3 Hun. 
( N.. Y.) 75 5 the trial court granted a . peremptory writ of 
mandamus requiring confirmation of an assessment of damages 
for injuries to the relator's property arising from the change 
of grade o£ a N e:w York street. The appellate court affirmed 
the judgment, stating with ref ere nee to mandamus: 
4:~The remedy by mandamus seems to be the appro" 
priate and only one at this stage of the proceedings. 
The relator has no remedy by action at law for her 
damages~ * * * Her sole remedy is through the special 
proceedings a utborized by statute~ and unless those 
rroceedings are regularly brought to complete con~ 
summation, she cannot enforce payment as permitted 
by the acts above ref erred to. Whatever official step 
is essential to that end, VvT hen ever it becomes a duty 
which an officer or board of officers is legally bound to 
per form~ becomes also the appropriate subject of 
mandamus~ if the officer refuses to perform the duty 
to the prejudice of public or private rights.~~ 
The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of 
New Y ark on the basis of the opinion of the Appellate Division. 
In McDowell e/ ux. r. City of Ashville (1983) 112 N.C+ 
747, 17 S.E~ 537, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld 
18 
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the action of the trial court in granting mandamus: to compel 
the city to assess damages to plaintiff's land pursuant to a 
special statutory procedure. The Court said: 
'!Now, it rna y be true~ as contended by counsel, that 
the defendant alone having the power to initiate statu· 
tory proceedings~ and having failed to do so, may be 
treated as· a trespasser, and sued in ejectment * * * 
but is is clear that such· a remedy \vould not be approw 
pria te to the particular circwnstances of this case. The 
defendant is still occupying the land as a street, claim· 
ing it under the right of eminent domain conferred 
by its charter~ and the plaintiffs evidently prefer that 
the street should remain~ and therefore do not elect 
to treat the defendant as a tr~spasseL Such being the 
cas eJ the a propriate temedy is to compel the defendant 
to assess damages as provided by its charter~ In accord· 
ance with this v ie\N it has often been held that man· 
damus is a proper remedy in cases of this character. 
Mr~ High (Extr. Rem. 31.8) says ~the writ has fre· 
quently been granted to protect the rights of land-
owners to compensation for their lands taken in the 
construction of \vorks of public improvements; and 
where a ra.il,vay or other corporation is vested ~vith 
the right of eminent domain, it may be compelled to 
mandamus to take the necessary steps for summoning 
a jury to assess damages £or the pto petty taken or 
damaged.· [citing oth et' authorities]. These authorities 
abundantly sustain the position that, where the statute 
does not provide that the o'vner may ·institute pro-
ceedings, the party condemning~ on \vhom it is im-
posed the duty~ may be compelled to do so by man· 
dam us. Being clearly of this opinion~ we have deemed 
it unnecessary to enter in to an el abo rate discussion 
of all the authorities presented by the intelligent 
counsel~·' 
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In GihJon v~ City Council of G1reenville ( 1902) 64 S.C. 
455., 42 S.E~ 206, a property owner sought a writ of mandamus 
to compel the def~idant City Council to appoint a commission 
to assess the amount of damages suffered by the plain tiff 
through the alteration o£ the grade of Main Street On appeal 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the action of 
the trial court in granting the writ, saying: 
4 ~In {an earlier case] the City Council of Green ville 
defeated an action for damages at common-law on the 
ground that the statutory remedy is exc tusive, and now 
attempts to defeat the remedy provided by statute on 
the ground that it has not been heretofore adjudged 
liable to make compensation, and that such ·liability 
is denied :t and that such is sues carmot be determined 
in the statutory remedy. This is no defense whatever 
against the perfo rma.nce of its plain ministerial duty 
under the statute; the undisputed facts being that W. Cr 
Gibson is the owner of the lot abutting on Main Street~ 
in said city; that the grade of said street has been 
altered by the City Council; that the lot owner claims 
to have been damaged thereby, and demands com-
pensation; that the lot owner has requested the City 
Council to appoint a commissioner to assess compen-
sation under Sect. 30 of the City Chatter; and that the 
City Council has refused to make such appointment..~ J 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota regarded mandamus as 
a proper remedy in State v. Ander Jon ( 1945) 220 lvfinn~ 139~ 
19 N.W. 2d 7. This was an action in which the issue was 
whether property owners not joined in a condemnation pro-
ceeding might intervene where· they cla.i:tned that their property 
had been damaged by the in1provement In disrussing the 
Minnesota condemnation statutes on the question of whether 
20 
;i 
... ~ 
·=r 
. r:~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
intervention should be petmitted or whether the property 
owner should be required to mandamus the commissioner to 
join them as parties in the condemnation proceeding, the Court 
said: 
~~Taking all the statutory provisions together, it 
seems not too grea.t a. strain on the judicial conscience 
to hoi d that it is t h c ministerial duty of the commis r 
sioner to start condemnation p roc eedin gs against land 
that he has already subjected to damage for highway 
purposes. If so, tben mandamus \Vill lie) and in the 
proceeding all issues may be determined. 
~.In this state) a v..Tti t of mandamus is a civil action' 
which give 5 the state -officers an opportunity to answer 
and set up either that the land was not damaged or 
that the State pro poses to remedy or has remedied the 
construction which causes the damage and therefore 
that it does not seek to acquire an easement or title. 
The issue so raised may thus be tried in the ordinary 
way by witnesses subject to cross-examination~ 1 • 
The Court 'vent on to adopt mandamus as the ordinary 
procedure by ~Thich property o~vners may assure a hearing 
on the question of damages to their property. Although th~ 
Minnesota statute dill ers in substantial respects from that of 
Utah, the Court did recognize the need for and propriety of 
mandamus. • 
In Clark v. City of Elizabeth eta!. ( 1898) 61 N .J.L. 565~ 
40 At l. 616, 7 3 7 :t a property O\vne.r brought a mandamus to 
corhpel the city to take appropriate action to determine damages 
due rei a tor for injuries to her property r csul ting from a change 
of street grade. A judgment for the defendant ~vas reversed 
on appeal. In discussing the appropriateness of mandamus 
as a remedy the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey 
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held that the Act of 1889 did more than confer simp I y a dis" 
cretionary power notwithstanding it used the words "1t shall 
be lawful for the municipal authorities in ~y such city to 
make or cause to be made a proper award for damages~'' the 
Court saying: 
~'[This contention cannot be yielded tor Words which~ 
in their ordinary acceptation~ .and when interpreted 
exclusive of the context and the subject matter~ imply 
a discretion or power, such as ~it shall be lawful,' and 
the like~ became in the construction of statutes manda-
tory where such is the legislative intent. The general 
rule is stated as follo1;\rs: tWhere a statute con£ ers 
authority to do a judicial, or _t indeed, any other, act, 
which the public interest or even individual right may 
demand, it is. imperative on those so authorized to 
exercise the authority when the case arises, and its 
·exercise is duly applied for by a party interested) and 
having a right to make the application.' * * * 
~ ~ .* * * The power [to assess damages] is one that 
exists for the bene:fi t of the persons injured by such 
public improvements a.s the parties in teres ted~ and the 
authority to have an assessment of damages made is 
a power given for their benefit, and, although ex-
pressed in language in form discretionary, it is in reality 
upon settled 1 ega 1 pr inci pIes imperative.~ t 
The view that mandamus is available as a. remedy to 
compel initiation of condemnation proceedings was aflirmed in 
Empire TruJt Company v. Board of Commerce and Navigation 
et al. (1940) 124 N.J.L. 406, 11 A.2d 752') in which the Court 
refused declaratory rei ie£ on the ground that it was not main-
tainable, under New Jersey practice, if another adequate remedy 
\'oJ' as a vailab 1 e~ and mandamus -=·commanding the institution 
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of condemnation proceedings to fix compensation for lands 
taken J' was available to petitioner. 
The tig~t to mandamus has been. recogp.ized~ also, tn a 
number of other cases. See Folmar v. Brantley et al. (1939) 
238 Ala~ 681~ 193 So. 122, in which the Court denied mandamL~S 
because the ·right to relief was not shown but recognized that 
mandamus is a proper remedy where condemnation has not 
been br~ught; People v. Sass ( 1898) 179. Ill. 357, 49 N.E . 
. 501 ~ in vol vin g the power of a city to sell property for special 
assessments v..!here the property upon v./hich the improvement 
was placed had not been .first acquired by the condemnation, 
and in which the Court held that whether th~ p rope tty has 
be~n acquired made no difference since the property owner has 
other remedies~ among which is man dam us to C'?m pel the city 
to condemn the property; Klaus v. Mayor of Jefsey Cit"y ( 1903) 
69 N.J~L.· 127, 54 Atl. 220, \Vhich \\-'"as an .action in mandatnu.s 
to compel city authorities to have a proper award· made and 
the mandamus was granted; i11aunt Vernon Realty Corporation 
v. City of Mount Vern on ( 1934) _241 App. Div. 882, 2 71 
N.Y.S+ 742] in ";rhich an action for damages was dismissed but 
~t was held that an abutter whose property is damaged by a 
change of grade is limited to the statutory temedy of condem-
nation) t~and in event such proceedings are. not brought he 
may mandamus the municipality to institute them''; and State 
v~ J?oard.of SuperviJors, etr~ of Tatun of Leon ( 1896) 66 Wis. 
199~ 28 N.W. 140, in which a writ of mandamus ~~as hcJd 
to be a proper means of compelling in~tiation of procc~dings 
to asse~s d~ges. 
· This Court has never directly decided the question of 
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whether mandamus ~s available to compel the individual 
members of the State Road Commission to initiate condem~ 
nation proceedings. It has held that they may be en joined from 
ptoceeding with construction of a project if the construction 
will damage property of an abutting O\Vner and no proceedings 
for condemnation have been initiated. StateJ by State Road 
Commission et a£~ v .. District Court, Fourth Judicial DiJtrict 
( 193 7) 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502. In the above cited case~ 
the Court went a. 1 ong way toward clarifying the rights of 
the individual as against the rights of the State in the con~ 
struction of pub lie improvements. It held~ in making permanent 
a \V ri t prohibiting the District Court from proceeding directly 
against the State Road Commission as such~ that a suit against 
the Commission is a suit against the State and that the State's 
cloak of inununi ty fits the State Road Commission as well. 
The Court was not confronted directly with the question of 
whether mandan1us will lie. However, at page 509 of the 
Pacific Reporter the Court quote~ with approval language of 
the Supreme Court of West Virginia in which it was stated 
that mandamus against the commissioner would lie to com pel 
condemnation of a property owner~s land~ 
Our Rule 6 5B (b) provides tha. t if there is no other plain, 
speedy and .adequate remedy relief rna y be obtained: 
~~where the relief sought is to compel any in£ erior 
tribunal, or any corporation, board or person to pet-
£ orm an act which the law specially en joins as a duty 
resulting fro1n an office~ trust or action; * * * j • 
The plaintiff cannot bring its action against the State 
because the State has not consented to be sued; under the 
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decision in the fourth District Couft case) neither will an 
action lie directly ·against the State Road Comtnission; under 
the decision in H jorth v.. Whittenburg ( 1952) 121 li~ 324, 
2·i 1 P.2d 907, qamages cannot be recovered from ind~vid~~l 
members of the State Road Commission for injury to . prope~ty 
~·i thout condemnation. Accordingly, if the plaintiff is . not , 
able to com pel the defend ants~ through issuance of mandamus 
pursuant to Rule 6SB(b) (3) the plaintiff if left 1\~"ith only the 
diffuse aroma of a ~~remediless right;'l Where injunction is avail-
. . 
able to protect the quick and the clairvoyant, mandamus ought 
to be available to protect the rest of us. As this Court said in th_e 
Fourt District Court case: 
~~we are of the opinion that v,..:here private property 
1 s taken or damaged for public use, as is a] le ged in 
the complaint in the injunction suit,· without any agree-
ment Vt~"ith the owner for compensation, and Vl/lthout 
any proceedings for· assessment in the 1nanner ·pro.-
vid ed by the statute relating to eminent domain,. a court 
of equity may properly take jurisdiction where the 
only remedy remaining to the land o~~rner is to present 
a claim to the. ·Board of Examiners.t~ 
It is inconceivable that the Court's consoling statement 
to the losing plaintiffs in Hjorth t·. Wh·ittenburg-that relief 
might be obtained from the Board of Examiners~\vas meant 
as a renunciation of the point of view so carefully spelled out 
in the Fourth District Court case: 
t~ * * * Under the statutes of Utah relating to emi~ 
nent domain, and under the constitutional provisions 
of U tab herein referred to,. the p 1 a in tiffs in tb e in j unc-
tion suit cannot be compelled to submit to the legis-
lature or the Board of Exa.m.iners the question whether 
their property has b ecn damaged by the construction 
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complained of nor the question of what amount will 
compensate them for such damage. ~t 
In the above holding the Court recognized that the courts, 
not the legislature or the Board o£ Examiners~ were established 
by the Constitution for the protection of minority rights .. The 
political arm of the government ptotects the rights o £ the 
rna j ori ty; it i J the rna j or ity. Its decisions can be based on whim 
or political expediency. But our Constitution protects the indi-
vidual by providing that just compensation shall be paid for 
damage to property for public use (Art I, Sec. 22) ; that the 
constitutional provisions are mandatory and prohibitory (Art. 
I, Sec. 2 6) ; and that the Courts shall be open to every person 
so that he may ~chave remedy by .due course of J..a,v·' for injury 
to him or his property (Art. I~ Sec. 11) + These provisions are 
met not by permitting supplicants to ask for compensation 
but by permitting plaintiffs to demand it. 
IV 
IF MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE, THIS IS A PROPER 
CASE FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION 
AGAINST THE INDJVJDUAL MEMBERS OF THE ROAD 
COMMISSION. 
Appellant recognizes that one of the conditions for grant· 
ing the extraordinary remedies provided by Rule 6SB~ Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure) is that ~~no other plain~ adequate and 
speedy remedy exists.·~ Some courts have held mandamus to 
be improper where relief could be obtained through a decla.ra~ 
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tory judgment action; appellants therefore included tn the 
complaint a] legations of a controversy with the members of 
the Road Commission concerning the appellant's rights and 
the commission memberst duties under the constitution and 
statutes of Utah. The prayer of the complaint asked, alter-
nately, for an order pursuant to Rule 65B(b) (3) and a. decla--
ration~ pursuant to Title 7 8~ Chapter 3 3, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
It is provided in 78-33-2 Utah Code .Annotated 1953 that: 
·'Any person in teres ted under a deed~ \V ill or written 
. contract or whose rights~ status or other J egal r e lations 
are affected by a statute~ municipal ordinance, contract 
or franchise, may have determined any question of con~ 
struction or validity. arising under th~ instrument, 
statute, ordinance, con tract or franchise and obtain a. 
declaration of rights~ status or other legal relations 
thereunder. J:> 
An action against a public official is not a ~·suit against 
the Statetj, where it is brought to compel the pctformance of 
a ministerial duty. This has long been accepted. In H a us ton v: 
~ ~ 
Ormes ( 1920) 252 U.S. 469~ 40 S. Ct. 369~ 64 L. Ed. 667, 
it was contended that because the object of the suit and the 
effect of the decree were to com pel action by government 
officers ln the performance of their official duties the suit was· 
in effect one against the United States. But the Supreme Court 
of the United States said: 
~~But* * *it is clear that the officials of the Treasury 
are chatged with the ministerial duty to make pay- __ 
tnent on demand to the person designatedr It is settled 
that in such a suit a case brought by the person entitied 
to the performance of the duty against the official 
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charged with its performance is not not a suit against 
~he government. So it has been declared by this Court 
tn many cases relatj ng to state officers .1 ' 
In Minnesota v. Hitchcock ( 1901) 185 U.S. 3 73} 22 S. Ct. 
65 0, 46 L. Ed. 954~ the Court held that although a suit against 
' officers of the United States might be in effect a snit against 
the United States, whether it was or not depe~ded upon what 
was sought to be accomplished. 
t~Of course~ this statement (that the State, though 
not named~ rna y be the real party in interest] had no 
reference to and did not include those cases in which 
officers of the United States are sued!t in appropriate 
form, to compel them to perform some ministerial duty 
imposed upon them by law~ and which they wrong· 
fully neglect or refuse to perform. Such suits would 
not be deemed suits against the United States within 
the rule that the government cannot be sued except 
by its consent nor within the rule established within 
_the Ayers case_~~ 
So it doesn't seem to make much difference whether the 
·action is for mandamus or for a declaratory judgment Each 
of the appellantst claims for relief seeks to compel administra· 
tive officers to perform their ministerial duty. A mandatory 
order to the defendants might be issued under 78-33-8 Ctah 
Code Annotated 1953+ 
The court in State v. District Court~ Fourth Judicial DtJtrict 
( 1937) 94 Utah 384> 78 P .. 2d 502~ supra~ held that a suit 
against the individual members of the Utah State Road Com~ 
mission to enjoin them from proceeding with construction 
of a high way was not a suit against the State. There is no 
valid distinction between that case and an action for mandamus 
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or declaratory relief. This court has 4ecided cases on the medts 
although brought against state officers or boards. ·see~ · fo·r 
example~ UniverJity of Utah v .. Boat-d of Examinefs of State 
of Lltah et al. (1956) 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d .348;: and 
Bateman v. BoaJ"d of Examiners. of the State of Utah ( 1958} 
7 Utah 2d 221, 332 P.zd 381. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the complaint in this case the appellant would have 
been entitleq to prove that it was an abutter on both Main 3:nd 
Seventh South Streets in Springville; and that the defendants, 
acting as members of the Utah State Road Cotnmission, had 
constructed certain barriers within Main Street. Appellant 
w9uld be entitled to show that access to and from its property 
by way of either Seventh South Street or Main- Street was .sub· 
stantially affected and that the property might not be usable 
by anyone except folks coming from Thistle. Appellant \\'Ould 
also be entitled to shOW that it has not been COlli pen sated for 
the damage to its property; that the defendants have refused 
to comp~nsate it~ disclaiming any obligation to do 50 7 and 
asserting that even if there is such an obJigation, there is no 
way for the a ppell.an t to en£ orce it. This .rep resents the kind 
of '~due process}~ problem that the United States Supreme Court 
turned a\vay fr~m in .M.artin v. Creasy ( 1959), U.S. 79 S~ Ct. 
3 L. Ed+ 2d 1186t but will probably have to look in the face 
before asphalt completely replaces turf ... 
The trial court should not have dismissed the action. The 
complaint stated a claim upon which relief (one type or the 
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other) can be granted+ If injunction is a proper remedy against 
individual members o£ the Road Commission) mandamus and 
declaratory judgment are just as proper. To deny the appellants 
the relief sought in this action would be to make two distinc-
tions, by the making of which relief of parties would depend 
not so much upon the merits of their. causes, but upon a happen-
stance. A party could protect himself or notJ ~epending upon 
whether he was able to act quickly enough to enjoin construcw 
tion, or could f otesee the kind of dat:riages that might result 
from it. Another parqls tights might depend upon whether 
the Road Commission were able to reach a settLement with 
all of the property owners atong the route being constructed 
or tepaired, for if the C..ommission were not able to arrive 
at a settlement and had to condemn property owners might, 
under the provisions of 78-34-7 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
intervene in an action as parties and have their dam.ages de-
termined .. 
The trial court erred in dismissing the action~ The judg-
ment should be reversed a.nd the case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted~ 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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